I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, and by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment.
In the last fifteen years a large literature on corruption has developed, as the view that corruption is a second-best solution to excessively cumbersome bureaucracy has given way to a concern that it is a brake on economic growth. The empirical side of this literature has focused on bribes paid by businesses, based on surveys of business executives asking them for their impressions of the level of corruption in their country of operation. 1 The theoretical literature includes analysis of bribes paid by individuals 2 , but studies by economists have usually neglected the possibility that an implicit quid pro quo could substitute for a bribe. More generally, the economic literature has not drawn on the work of social scientists analyzing the implications of trust and personal relations for social and economic interactions.
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In this paper, I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers whether trust could be established between the official and the client. Bilateral trust permits the substitution of an implicit quid pro quo for a bribe, which reduces corruption in the situations I consider. Appropriate trust networks are more likely to exist in circumstances where space or time facilitate many encounters between people: in small towns, among long-term residents of an area, and among older people. I look for evidence for this in the data, and I assess the overall importance of income as a determinant of bribery relative to other characteristics of individuals. I also consider the links between trust, bribery and crime at the individual and regional levels. 4 There are several reasons why the study of bribes paid by individuals is an important extension of the literature studying businesses. Although the sums paid by businesses are likely to be higher, the effective tax imposed on individuals by the need to pay bribes could be equivalent, and hence important on welfare grounds. Bribery by individuals is also a cause for concern for distributional reasons. An inability to pay bribes may exclude the poor from certain public services, or force them to accept lower quality or delayed service. Another concern is that widespread payment of small bribes by individuals in everyday settings may create a climate in which business corruption becomes acceptable. Business corruption, in turn, could have static or dynamic macro effects that disadvantage the poor. 5 Finally, individual bribery may be part of a wider pattern of dishonesty and distrust that reduces the quality of life through crime and more subtle channels.
The importance of measuring the actual prevalence of bribery rather than an impression of how much other people are bribing, as in the existing literature, is obvious. The difficulty when businesses are the unit of interest is that a question about actual payment of bribes is too sensitive. 6 By contrast, in countries where bribery is widespread, there is little stigma or danger attached to an individual's admitting that he or she has paid a bribe. 7 I use data from 34 countries in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, Latin America, Africa and Asia from the International Crime Victim Surveys, which ask whether in the previous year any government official had asked the respondent for a bribe or expected a bribe. An additional advantage of the data is that they allow a study of the link between victimization and bribery at the individual level for the first time.
I find that older people and residents of small towns are less likely to bribe. Further, I
find that while a long-term resident of an area is slightly less likely to bribe, this effect is 5 Gupta et al. (1998) . 6 Some surveys ask about bribe prevalence among "similar firms". 7 Miller et al. (1998) tabulate data on bribes paid by individuals "in the last few years". Kibwana et al. (1996) have data on bribes paid in Kenya.
significantly more pronounced if the area has many other long-term residents. These results are consistent with the use of trust networks and the implicit quid pro quo in small towns and when age or low geographic mobility facilitate network formation over time. The network effect is strongest for bribery of general officials, police and inspectors, rather than customs officers, medical and educational staff, presumably because the former are the officials encountered most regularly.
These results are of grave concern for many developing countries. Many poorer countries continue to undergo rapid urbanization, implying many city residents are new arrivals, have much larger cities than richer countries, and have higher fertility and hence a greater share of young people. All these factors are detrimental to the formation of trust networks, and favorable to bribery.
I find that the rich pay the most bribes and the poor the least, while in the middle range bribery is insensitive to income. I argue that this latter result may reflect a greater facility of middle-income clients in using implicit quid pro quos, in part because the public officials are also likely to be middle-income, and thus move in the same circles. However, city size, age, sex, and ownership of a car all have a larger effect on bribery than income. The relatively small role of income provides some reassurance that the poor are not being excluded from public services.
I show that individuals who have been victims of crimes are more likely to bribe.
However, this is not because their victimization brings them into contact with more officials, since the effect of reported and unreported victimization is the same, and the effect is similar for bribes to a variety of public officials. I conjecture that crime flourishes in an environment with low one-sided trust in institutions and a lack of faith in the honesty of one's peers. This environment is conducive to the payment of bribes, but fosters too little trust to permit implicit quid pro quos or to facilitate honest dealings.
Using within-country variation in regional crime rates, and conditioning on victimization, I show that regional fraud is particularly strongly related to bribery. This widespread crime may be detrimental to the atmosphere of trust in a region or may be the first result of reduced trust.
Causality is likely to go both ways, suggesting that fraud should be the object of particular concern for policy-makers wishing to reduce corruption.
Theoretical Considerations

Trust networks
A theoretical and experimental social science literature analyzes the effect of risk in economic and social transactions on the formation of trust networks. 8 In the face of widespread dishonesty and corruption, a second-best solution is to form networks of family, friends and other trusted members, and to conduct transactions within this network. Bonds of trust may be formed by gift-exchange, an observation originally made by anthropologists. One person may offer a good or service to another without insisting on immediate payment, with an implicit or explicit expectation of reciprocity. If reciprocity does occur, bilateral trust will be established, allowing for future mutually beneficial transactions. Experimental evidence has shown that implicit quid pro quos establish greater trust than explicit quid pro quos.
For a client and official to establish trust, they must expect to have repeated encounters.
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This could happen if bureaucracy is so high as to require frequent transactions between the pair, or in small communities or ethnic groups where the pair would naturally interact in other settings. 10 A longer time horizon also implies more encounters, so trust is more likely to be established among long-term residents of a town and among older people.
Rose-Ackerman (1999 chapter 6) characterizes a bribe as a payment to the agent (as opposed to the principal) in the presence of an explicit quid pro quo. A public official is an agent of the government, and thus, any payment to him or her that is explicitly in return for service is a bribe. Rose-Ackerman's discussion suggests that in the context of this paper, she would also consider an exchange based on an implicit quid pro quo to be a bribe. One could imagine officials or potential clients in a small town who try to be helpful in their dealings with all people, not from altruism, but from the knowledge that making friends pays off in the future. I consider this to be an implicit quid pro quo, but one that is not corrupt: officials give the same treatment to all clients. On the other hand, if the trust network is only a subset of the relevant population, implicit quid pro quos can distort access to public services as much as explicit quid pro quos. The types of network I identify in this paper are accessible to a large share of the relevant population, at least over the life-cycle, and their facilitation of implicit quid pro quos will therefore reduce corruption.
The exchanges involving the least trust are those where the official can provide the service immediately and the client pays on the spot (although Varese (2000) notes that all bribes require some trust, if betrayal is possible). An explicit quid pro quo with leading or lagged payments involves more trust, and an implicit quid pro quo involves the most trust. I believe that survey respondents are not likely to report implicit quid pro quos as bribes, and that my empirical trust proxies should therefore identify where explicit quid pro quos are replaced by implicit quid pro quos.
10 Bulgarians from small villages in the Miller et al. (1999) focus groups mentioned "People know each other. Bribes are not expected."
When I consider the links between crime and trust the issues are somewhat different. In this context, trust should lead to honesty, rather than a network for mutually beneficial but possibly illegal exchange (the exception being the case of criminal gangs). Furthermore, the type of trust required to reduce crime is generalized, rather than bilateral, trust.
Payment in cash versus payment with service
Implicit quid pro quos will generally not involve cash, or even an object, since this would usually make them explicit bribes. More usually, an implicit quid pro quo will involve an exchange of services, probably some time apart. 11 A bribe paid simultaneously with the receipt of the official's service usually implies payment with cash or an object. The distinction between client payment in cash/object versus payment with a service is therefore correlated with the bribe versus implicit quid pro quo distinction, and with immediate payment versus a payment that leads or lags the official's service. The correlation is not perfect, however, since an explicit quid pro quo could also have a leading or lagged payment, and could also be in the form of a service.
Nevertheless, in connection with implicit quid pro quos, it is useful to consider when an official may prefer to be paid in services.
In societies with poorly developed markets, some services such as insurance may not be available for purchase with cash. In small communities it could be good relations during leisure time or with neighbors. Honest private services or provision of private goods where information is imperfect is also valuable: 30% of respondents in my sample report being victims of fraud in the previous year, principally in stores. It appears that much fraud cannot be detected until it is too late to obtain restitution (only 4% of frauds were reported to the police). If the fraud cannot 11 I classify selling something at a discount or providing objects such as food in time of need as services.
be detected as it is perpetrated, it is unlikely that paying extra (a bribe) to the fraudster will be sufficient to avoid being defrauded. A bond of trust is required instead. Another favor an official may want from a client, the employment of a relative, may be available more cheaply as part of an exchange of services than for cash: the client might perceive the risk of obtaining a job for the relative of a bribe-taking official to be higher, as the relative might also be corrupt, which would reflect badly on the client.
It is possible that some services, such as being a good neighbor, are not very costly to the client, so the client might prefer to pay in this currency. More commonly, however, I argue that the client is indifferent between paying with cash and a service. A dishonest car mechanic can forego profit by doing honest repairs for the official, or can pay the equivalent as a bribe to the official.
The role of client income
An official must have some monopoly power in order to be corrupt, or his or her rents would be competed away. It is likely that bribe-taking officials discriminate on the basis of client income. If corrupt officials discriminate perfectly, clients who can pay the marginal cost of the official's service will get it, while others will not receive service. Amongst those who bribe, larger bribes will be expected of the richer clients. Richer people will also demand more goods and services, which lead to them having more encounters with officials and paying more bribes in the course of their consumption. Bribery frequency should therefore rise with income.
However, if officials move in middle-income circles, they are more likely to form trust networks with middle-income clients. It is also possible that middle-income clients have the most interesting services to be offered as part of an implicit quid pro quo. Poor people may not provide good insurance or have jobs where they can dispense favors or honest service. The value of rich people's services may be less than what they can offer in cash. The substitution of implicit quid pro quos by middle-income clients may weaken the strength of the relation between income and bribery prevalence.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
I use 1990s data on countries outside the traditional OECD from the International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS), conducted for the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice
Research Institute. 12 Interviews are conducted face-to-face with a randomly selected member of the household. Almost two thirds of the observations are from countries making the transition from communism: Appendix 1 lists the full set of countries. In many countries the ICVS surveyed only particular neighborhoods, in the capital city. Neighborhoods were chosen based on economics status, rather than randomly, although the samples are random within neighborhoods.
The survey focuses on the details of respondents' experiences of victimization, but also inquires about bribery. The question asked is: "In some countries, there is a problem of corruption among government or public officials. During 199x, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, a police officer or inspector in your country asked you, or expected you to pay a bribe for his or her services?". Respondents who answer yes are then asked what type of government official was bribed (somewhat oddly, the first option is "government official"), and then whether the incident of corruption was reported (which is almost never the case). The survey also asks respondents how long they have lived in the "area" ("area" is not defined). The amount of the bribe is not asked.
I drop only observations with missing values, and use a sample of 47,111 individuals.
However, I retain observations with missing income information, indicating them with a dummy variable, since these represent 10% of the sample, and their exclusion makes the number of bribes rather small for the purposes of the multinomial logits described below. Also, Estonia and Slovenia lack information on time lived in the area, but I retain them as they contain valuable observations from small towns (and represent 6% of the sample). The effect of missing area tenure is captured by the country dummies. Table 2 shows that the two most common types of bribes were those paid to a government official (24%), and those paid to the police (34%). For the subset of data for which a more detailed categorization is available, the most common "other" type of bribe was paid to nurses and doctors.
The unweighted means of the main variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 3 (additional means are shown in Appendix 2). The income quartiles refer to the country-specific distributions. The means of the city size dummies reflect the over-sampling of large cities: only 13 The CPI can be obtained at www.transparency.org/cpi/index.html#cpi.
25% of respondents live in cities of less than 100,000 inhabitants. 14 64% of respondents have lived in their area for ten years or more: six percentage points of the remainder have missing values as they are in Estonia or Slovenia. 36% of respondents own one car, 8% own two cars, and 2% own three or more cars. Although the 48% of the sample that is working is overrepresented amongst those having paid bribes, they nevertheless represent only 60% of those paying bribes, which represents an upper bound on the share of bribes that could have been paid in the course of business. 30% of respondents claimed to have been victims of consumer fraud in the previous calendar year (of whom 60% report being defrauded in a shop).
Empirical Specification
I examine the determinants of bribery with probits and multinomial logits. I begin with probits for the probability of an individual i in region r of country c paying a bribe in year t:
All specifications include a year dummy (δ t ) and country dummies (γ c ). Long-term irct is a dummy indicating whether the respondent has lived in the area for ten years or more, while
rct is the average of this variable for other respondents in the region. β 4 is a coefficient of particular interest, as it will be negative if trust networks are formed between longterm residents, and if these networks lead to the replacement of bribes with implicit quid pro quos. X includes other respondent characteristics of interest, such as city size and income quartile dummies.
Since some neighborhoods are chosen based on city size and neighborhood affluence, I present only specifications that control for the respondent's income quartile and city size, as well as dummies for the size of the household (to adjust household income, to adjust for the underrepresentation of large households introduced by interviewing only one household member, and to take into account the number of people on whose behalf the respondent might potentially pay bribes). 15 I also always include country dummies and a year dummy (only one year dummy is separately identified). I adjust the standard errors to allow for correlation among observations in the same region, and report marginal effects.
I then investigate how the determinants of bribes vary according to the recipient of the bribe by estimating multinomial logits with six categories: the first (omitted) for no bribe paid, and the remaining five for bribes paid to the five types of official. I report odds ratios (exponentiated coefficients). For both probits and multinomial logits I report t-statistics. Table 4a contains coefficients from various specifications of a probit for the probability of having paid a bribe in the previous year. The specification of column 1 contains no variables beyond those included in all regressions (described in the previous section). The first three rows of numbers show that the probability of a bribe varies greatly by income: the bottom quartile's probability is six percentage points lower than that of the (omitted) top quartile, compared to an average probability of 12%. The second and third quartiles are similar, with a probability about four percentage points lower than that of the top quartile. The variation by city size is similarly large: inhabitants of the smallest towns are seven percentage points less likely to bribe than those of the omitted category of cities of more than one million, and the gap declines as the city size increases. The importance of city size and the insensitivity of bribery to income in the middle of the distribution are consistent with a reduction in bribes through trust networks and implicit quid pro quos.
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Probit Results
Bribes and individual characteristics
In column 2 I add the three variables related to tenure in the area. As predicted, the coefficient on the interaction between individual and regional long term residence has a negative and significant coefficient (row 1): respondents who have lived in their area a long time (ten years or more), and live in a region where many others have lived in their area a long time, bribe less. For a long-term resident, an increase of ten percentage points in the share of others in the region who are also long-term residents reduces his or her probability of bribing by 0.89 percentage points.
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I have demeaned the regional share of long-term residents, so the dummy for a long-term resident indicates that in an average region, long-term residents bribe 2.5 percentage points less.
Short-term residents are more likely to bribe if others in the region are long-term residents: an increase of ten percentage points in the share of long-term residents causes a short-term resident to bribe more by 1.25 points (column 2, row 3).
In the subsequent columns I control for an increasing number of other covariates. In the specification of column 3 I add controls for car ownership, in column 4 I add controls for age, and in column 5 I add controls for motor cycle and bicycle ownership, sex, education and labor force status. Columns 3-5 show the addition of these controls (in particular, age) reduces the coefficients on the dummy for long-term resident and its interaction, particularly the former.
Long-term residents tend to be older, and the two effects were confounded in columns 2 and 3.
The results of column 5 indicate that long-term residents bribe a significant 0.6 percentage points less in an average region, and that an increase of ten percentage points in the share of others who are long-term residents reduces the bribe prevalence of a long-term resident by a further 0.57 percentage points.
The addition of the covariates in columns 3-5 leaves the coefficients on the city size dummies unchanged. However, they cut the coefficients on income quartile more than in half.
Age and car ownership, in particular, are correlated with income, and their addition reduces the effect of income.
In columns 6 and 7 I add covariates capturing victimization. The only coefficients to be affected are those on city size, which are reduced. In the specifications of columns 1-5, the city size coefficients were picking up both trust effects, and the victimization effects, since larger cities have more crime. 18 This link itself is likely to be related to less personalized and trusting interactions between people in larger cities.
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Further coefficients from the same regressions are reported in Table 4b . Column 3 shows that bribery increases by about 7 percentage points with each additional car owned. The addition of subsequent covariates reduces the effect of owning a car to 3-5 percentage points in column 5, however. Column 5 shows that women are less likely to bribe than men, by 4.7 percentage points, and that each year of education increases the probability of bribery by 0.29 percentage points, a small effect. Ownership of a motorcycle or moped also increases bribery, by 2.7
percentage points, while labor force status has little effect: only the negative coefficient on being 18 Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) .
19 Wirth (1938) is merely one example of an early paper on this topic. retired or disabled is significant, and its coefficient is small at 1.5 percentage points. The weakness of the labor force variables suggests that most bribes in the data set do not stem from business transactions.
Education may have a positive association with bribery because it reflects variation in income within the broad income categories available. Education may also reflect the usefulness of contacts with influential people formed while studying with them, and a greater understanding of government and hence insight into how to manipulate the system. One could equally argue,
however, that these contacts should allow an educated person to get services without resorting to bribery.
The age dummies of column 4 are plotted in Figure 1 with bars twice the size of standard error. (The age coefficients change little across the columns of Table 4b .) The figure indicates that people in their twenties and thirties are most likely to bribe (the omitted age category is 25-29), with a linear decline in probability from age 30-34. Teenagers are four percentage points less likely to bribe than the omitted group, presumably because their parents bribe on their behalf. People in their seventies or older are eight percentage points less likely to bribe.
The results of column 5 and Figure 1 show that several characteristics are more important than income in determining bribery. The importance of age could be related to trust: younger people may not yet have developed the personal networks necessary to avoid paying bribes.
There are, however, several other factors that might contribute to the result. There could be certain services one needs early in life that must be obtained with bribes, such as connection to electricity or telephone, a first driver's licence, a place at university, good grades at university, medical services for sick children, or paying oneself out of trouble with the police. Young people's inexperience may make them more vulnerable to demands made by officials. A different interpretation is that age coefficients represent cohort effects. However, this seems unlikely, since unreported regressions show the age pattern is similar in groups of countries in very different parts of the world.
Owning a car has a larger effect on bribery than the difference between the top and bottom income quartile. There could be several reasons for this: a car requires a licence and usually inspections, it may give an impression of wealth that attracts bribe-takers, driving it leads one to commit certain infractions such as speeding and leaves one vulnerable to false allegations of such infractions. The effects of owning a motorcycle or moped may be similar, or could possibly indicate involvement in a motorcycle gang. Ownership of a vehicle could also be endogenous: if one wishes to smuggle goods professionally, one needs to buy a car and bribe customs officials.
The effect of being female is also larger than the effect of income. Swamy et al. (2001) show that women disapprove of bribery more than men, and that female-run Georgian firms pay fewer bribes. They hypothesize that women may be more honest than men. 20 There are other possibilities, however. In some contexts it may be more effective for a woman to get a man to pay a bribe on her behalf, if his bargaining power is stronger. 21 Even at a given household income a woman may encounter fewer business situations where a bribe is required. 22 To the extent that some of the bribes occur in a criminal context, they are less likely to be paid by 20 Other coefficients in my regressions could also represent differences in attitudes to bribes across groups. 21 Marital status is not available in all countries, but in unreported regressions on a smaller sample, the coefficients on both having a spouse and its interaction with sex were insignificant. 22 Swamy et al. (2001) make the similar point that business women may not have the contacts necessary to pay bribes. However, an unreported regression shows that the interaction of female and working is insignificant.
women. Finally, however, some part of the effect could be because women may have more opportunity than men to pay in sexual favors, something perhaps not reported as a bribe. Table 4c column 6 reports the victimization coefficients introduced to the column 6 specification. Whether the individual had been a victim of assault, burglary, larceny, robbery or consumer fraud in the previous year is strongly associated with the payment of bribes. In particular, having been a victim of fraud raises the bribe probability by 7.2 percentage points.
Bribes and crime
Robbery and assault raise the probability by about five percentage points, while burglary and larceny raise it by about 2.5 percentage points
One explanation for the victimization effects is that crime is exogenous, and victims have to bribe the officials they must deal with when reporting the crime. This can be tested by dividing the crimes according to whether the victim reported them to the police or not. In the column 7 specification I provide two dummies for each crime category: whether the respondent had been a victim and had reported it or whether the respondent had been a victim and had not reported it. The results show that reporting the crime or not has little effect on its association with bribery, which rules out the proposed channel of causation. A different possibility is that victims perceive the rule of law or morality as being weak, which encourages them to bribe.
Alternatively, victims may be more likely than non-victims to live in an environment with low one-sided trust in institutions and a lack of faith in the honesty of one's peers. This type of environment is conducive to both crime and bribery, but not to the trust networks necessary for implicit quid pro quos, nor to honest service by public officials. Such an environment could correspond to a particular neighborhood, for example, or to groups involved in black markets.
I have also included measures of crime at the regional level in the probit regressions.
With crime measured at the regional level, the coefficient can reflect the fact that crime can be associated with bribes paid by non-victims, possibly criminals (the channel between victims and bribes is captured by the victimization dummies). The (unreported) coefficients are always insignificant, however. This strategy will be more informative in the multinomial logit setting.
Multinomial Logit Results
Individual level variables
Splitting bribery into several categories means that coefficients are less precisely estimated than in the probits, so that differences across categories in individual coefficients are not always significant. But the hypothesis that the coefficients (other than the country and year dummies) are the same for any pair of categories can be rejected in all regressions below. Table 5a displays coefficients from the multinomial equivalent of column 6 in Table 4 . Table 5a shows that the networking effect arising from long-term residency of an area seems to be important only for bribes to government officials (column 1) and the police (column 2), where the coefficient on the interaction of individual and regional long-term residency is significant, and possibly for inspectors (column 3), where the effect is large but imprecisely estimated. The first row shows that a ten percentage point increase in the share of other long-term residents reduces the relative probability of bribery by a long-term resident by 8% for government officials, and 10% for police.
Columns 1 and 5 show that bribes to government official and "other" officials appear to be non-monotonic in income (although insignificantly so), which may indicate the use of implicit quid pro quos by the middle-income. The biggest gap between the top and bottom quartiles is for bribery of customs officials (column 2) and inspectors (column 4): the bottom quartile has only half the relative probability of bribing that the top quartile does.
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The coefficients on city size in columns 1-5 indicate that the biggest differences between the largest and smaller cities are for bribery of police (the relative probability of bribing in the smallest towns is only 26% of that of the omitted category). It seems likely that the difference in city size effect across official types reflects differences in opportunities to bribe.
In Table 5b I report the coefficients on car ownership and other coefficients. The coefficient on single car ownership is largest for the police category (the relative probability is 2.1 times higher in column 3) and smallest for the "other" category (no significant effect in column 5). 24 The significance of car ownership for all categories of official suggests that the variety of explanations for its effect proposed in the previous section are all operative, but that the increased interactions with the police is the most important channel.
Education significantly increases bribery of government officials, customs and "other", but not of the police and inspectors (Table 5b ). The most noteworthy of the labor force status coefficients are for bribery of "other" officials: students and home-makers are particularly likely to make these bribes (50% and 30% more likely, respectively). Also, the gender differential is small for the "other" category. This is consistent with bribes to "other" officials being in the health and education sectors.
With three exceptions, the coefficients on all victimization dummies have significantly positive effects on bribes in all official categories, and the similarity of the coefficients across 23 When comparing magnitudes with the probits of Table 4 , recall that this is half of the probability of bribing this particular type of official, a much lower probability than the overall probability of bribing. 24 The car coefficients for police and customs are not significantly different from one another, but are significantly larger than for other types of official.
columns, indicating rises in relative probability of 50-100%, is more striking than the differences. The similarity of the coefficients suggests that the victimization variables indeed reflect individuals' living in situations of low trust, where crime rates and bribery of all types are high.
The coefficients on the age dummies are plotted in Figure 2 for the five officials categories. The standard errors are not indicated, but are such that the differences across categories tend to be insignificant. The odds ratio closest to one that is significant is 0.8. The age pattern is qualitatively similar across categories. However, the police bribery prevalence for teenagers is not as low as for bribery of other officials. This differential age pattern, and the large gender gap for police bribes, is probably driven by the propensity to commit crimes or generally get in trouble with the police by age and sex. The relatively high bribery of "other" officials by teens is consistent with bribery in education.
Regional-level variables
In Table 6 I examine the impact of certain regional-level variables whose values I compute from within the data set. The addition of these variables (to the specification of Table   5 ) changes the coefficients of the individual-level variables almost imperceptibly, and I therefore report only the coefficients on these regional variables. Each row in Table 6 reports results from a different regression (some of the regional variables are highly correlated). I begin by examining the impact of the share of people in the region who had been victims of the most common crimes, which can be reliably measured at the regional level: burglary, larceny and fraud.
The first three rows show that regional burglary and larceny are not significantly positively related to bribery, after controlling for individual victimization, while fraud, on the other hand, is significantly related (at the 5 or 10% level) to bribery of government officials, customs officers and police. 25 The coefficient of 69.9 for fraud in column 1 indicates that an increase in regional fraud prevalence of 10 percentage points increases the relative probability of bribing government officials by 52%. I have no explanation for the significantly negative relation between burglary and bribes to government officials (column 1 row 1).
These results suggest that the crime of fraud is one that should be given close attention in corrupt countries, but also indicate the difficulty of breaking the nexus between crime and bribery of the police. There does appear to be scope for increasing the power of inspectors to reduce fraud, although this action in turn could spur corruption among inspectors.
Since car ownership was such an important variable at the individual level, I investigate whether its regional variation plays a role in the fourth row of Table 6 . In regions with more cars, bribes to inspectors are actually lower: a ten percentage point increase in the share of people owning a car reduces the relative probability of bribes to inspectors by 37% (column 4).
However, regional car ownership is positively associated with bribes to customs (column 2). Car ownership may permit, or be the result of the possibility of smuggling. The actions of smugglers may corrupt customs, leading to more bribery by others too. The share of people in a region owning motorcycles or mopeds is positively associated with bribes to government officials and customs officers. This may also be related to smuggling.
Finally, since we know that rich countries have less bribery than poor countries, I
hypothesized that rich regions within countries would have less bribery than poor regions. The sixth row indicates that this is true only for bribes to police.
Conclusions
In this paper I study the determinants of bribery of public officials through a theoretical lens considering the implications of trust networks. Trust networks would facilitate the replacement of a bribe with an implicit quid pro quo, reducing corruption in the situations I consider. People in smaller communities and long-term residents of stable communities are more likely to establish such networks, as are older people. I find empirical evidence confirming that these types of people pay fewer bribes. The influence of trust networks appears to be strongest for bribes to general officials, police and inspectors, probably because there are the officials people have to deal with most often. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility.
The rich pay the most bribes and the poor the least, while in the middle range bribepaying is somewhat insensitive to income. This may indicate the use of implicit quid pro quos by middle-income clients, who may have the most appealing services to offer as part of an implicit quid pro quo, and who may move in similar circles to the public official. Income plays a surprisingly small role once other characteristics are controlled for. The relative unimportance of income provides some reassurance that the poor are not being excluded from public services.
I also present evidence that victims of crime are more likely to bribe all types of official, which explains part of the city-size effect. I show this is not because crime causes victims to have more contact with public officials. Crime may cause a breakdown in trust, or vice-versa, which leads to an environment conducive to bribes rather than honesty or implicit quid pro quos.
Measured at the regional level, and thus reflecting the effects of bribes paid by non-victims, possibly criminals, the crime of fraud is positively related to bribes to government officials, the police and customs. This suggests that particular attention should be paid to fraud: reducing its prevalence could be a way of increasing generalized trust and reducing bribes by non-criminals. Notes: Marginal effects of probits, 47,111 observations. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, adjusted for correlation within regions of countries. All regressions include a year dummy, household size dummies, country dummies, and a missing income quartile dummy. "% Others long-term" is measured as deviation from the mean. Regressions in columns 5-7 include a dummy for bicycle ownership, and a dummy for the "other" labor force category. Coefficients on car ownership, sex, education, motorcycle ownership and labor force status are reported in Table  4b . Coefficients on victimization variables are reported in Table 4c . Age coefficients are graphed in Figure 1 . Table 4a . Coefficients on income, city size and tenure in area are reported in Table  4a . Coefficients on victimization variables are reported in Table 4c . Age coefficients are graphed in Figure 1 . Table 4a . Coefficients on income, city size, tenure in area and car ownership are reported in Table 4a columns 5 and 6. Coefficients on age, sex, education, motorcycle ownership and labor force status are reported in Table 4b columns 5 and 6. Age coefficients are graphed in Figure 1 . Table 5a . Coefficients on income, city size, and tenure in area are reported in Table  5a . Age coefficients are graphed in Figure 2 . 
